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Ethical issues have been of concern to medical 
geneticists and genetic counsellors in South Africa 
since the delivery of genetic services officially started 
in the early 1970s. Ethics, as a form of philosophy, 
refers to systematic reflection on the moral aspects 
of life and the associated conflicts that may arise,[6] while biomedical 
ethics involves the study of ethical issues that occur in research, 
medicine and society. Traditionally, the paradigm that has guided 
medical geneticists is principle-based ethics.[7] The primary principles 
in this system include respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-
maleficence and justice, but autonomy seems to take a central 
position.[8] The professional may need to balance the demands 
of competing principles and select a course of action that could 
sometimes be considered paternalistic and as overriding respect for 
autonomy. For example, the conditional access to the Huntington’s 
disease (HD) predictive programme[5,9] could be seen as paternalistic. 
The principles are based on the ethics of care, which involve insight 
into and understanding of someone else’s circumstances, needs and 
feelings, and responsiveness on the part of the counsellor to that 
person’s situation.[10]
HD is a neurodegenerative disease that is inherited as an autosomal 
dominant condition.[11] The children of an affected parent have a 50% 
risk of inheriting the HD mutation and developing the disorder. The 
symptoms include choreiform movements, progressive dementia, 
cognitive dysfunction and psychiatric problems; onset is generally 
in the 40s, although a few juvenile cases have been reported. The 
causative gene and genetic mechanism were identified in 1993.[11] HD 
was found to be a triplet repeat disorder, and affected patients were 
found to have 40 or more triplet (CAG) repeats, the larger repeat 
sizes being associated with earlier onset and juvenile cases. With 
this knowledge, diagnostic, prenatal and predictive genetic testing 
became possible, and family members at risk could be informed of 
their status.
In the context of predictive testing for HD, the questions are 
whether it is ethical to provide individuals with information about 
their future health when no treatment for the condition is available, 
what the beneficence, non-maleficence and justice issues are, and 
if the service is offered, how it should be conducted fairly.[12] To 
assist genetic counsellors in dealing with these dilemmas, a set of 
guidelines for HD predictive testing was developed in the 1990s by 
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Professor Trefor Jenkins has had an interest in medical ethics and its application to genetics for many years. In 1979 he brought an expert in 
medical ethics, Professor Ernle Young of Stanford University, USA, to South Africa to stimulate interest in ethics and genetics among medical 
practitioners and students. In 1991 Professor Jenkins published a paper entitled ‘Molecular genetics in medicine: Sharing the benefits’,[1] in which 
he discussed the lack of equal access to and uptake of genetic services, the fact that all people in developing countries can benefit from such 
services, and the need for a more positive attitude to genetic health problems in Africa on the part of medical geneticists and planners.
Subsequently, in 1994, Professor Jenkins was invited to participate in the second worldwide survey on ethics and genetics. This survey included 
36 countries, and in South Africa 16 of the possible 21 respondents completed the questionnaire. The local results were reported by Kromberg 
and Jenkins[2,3] and integrated into the international report by Wertz.[4] In 1996 Professor Peter Harper of the University of Cardiff, Wales, was 
invited to South Africa and gave a keynote address entitled ‘Genetics and society – a challenge for the future’. He covered ethical issues such as 
the commercialisation of genetic tests, making pre-implantation and prenatal diagnoses, testing of children and confidentiality. From 1998 to 
2001 Professor Jenkins was appointed as a part-time lecturer in Medical Ethics at the University of the Witwatersrand, and from 2001 onwards 
he has been an honorary lecturer in Biomedical Ethics (now the Steve Biko Centre for Bioethics).
In the 1980s the staff of the Divison of Human Genetics set up a predictive testing programme for Huntington’s disease.[5] Many ethical issues 
arose during the genetic counselling involved in offering such testing. It therefore seemed appropriate to examine some of these issues in an 
article for this Festschrift.
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the International Huntington’s Disease Association (IHDA) and the 
World Federation of Neurology (WFN) and recently revised.[13]
In this paper two cases will be described and examined. The 
ethical principles that were evoked and the dilemmas that arose 
from these two actual patient consultations, in each of which the 
counsellor was one of us, will be discussed. The first (counselled 
by JGRK) involved the problem of possible monozygotic twinning 
and whether one twin had the right to have predictive testing for 
HD when the other refused such testing. The second (counselled 
by TW) presented a dilemma associated with the genetic testing 
of children, where one parent had HD and the children were being 
placed into foster care, with the possibility of being put up for 
adoption.
Predictive testing for HD in possible 
monozygotic twins
Some years ago, one (Twin A) of a pair of apparently monozygotic 
twin girls (Twins A and B) approached the genetic counselling 
clinic for a consultation regarding predictive testing for HD. Her 
mother was affected and had died a few years previously, and the 
patient, aged 40 years and in a stable relationship, wanted to know 
her status, as she planned to buy a house. She was aware of her 50% 
risk and that molecular testing was available. She added that she 
had an identical twin (Twin B), living in a distant city, who did not 
want testing, but their relationship was not close and they seldom 
communicated.
The predictive testing programme was explained to Twin A and 
she was told that she would have to see the HD team neurologist, to 
make sure that she did not have symptoms, and the psychiatrist, to 
make sure she was stable enough to take the good news (that she did 
not have the HD mutation) or the bad news (that she did have the 
mutation), after which she would return to the genetic counsellor for 
further discussion. Her partner, who accompanied her to this first 
session, was very supportive, understood the situation and promised 
further support whatever the result was. Twin A thought that she 
had a right to be tested, regardless of the reluctance of Twin B. The 
counsellor recognised that Twin A’s autonomy and freedom of choice 
were being compromised by the attitude of Twin B.
The client consulted the team members, who reported that she was 
a suitable candidate for testing. The twin sisters had also met, and 
they agreed that Twin B would consult her own genetic counsellor 
in the city where she lived. Later, this genetic counsellor confirmed 
that Twin B was adamant about rejecting testing and that Twin A 
should therefore be refused testing. This counsellor was concerned 
about Twin B’s rights and the non-maleficence and ‘do no harm’ 
principle. As a result, at the next appointment Twin A was told that, 
since Twin B would not accept testing and a result on Twin A’s HD 
test would give her identical twin an unwanted result, it would not be 
ethical to test Twin A. (The counsellor was giving precedence to the 
issues of justice and equality for both twins over the autonomy and 
rights of Twin A.) Twin A was very upset by this pronouncement, 
and was determined to return at a later date and demand the test. She 
stated that she was being controlled by Twin B, was being denied self-
determination and freedom of choice, and was being discriminated 
against because she was an identical twin.
At this point, because of the divergent opinions of the two genetic 
counsellors (each of whom felt that their patient’s needs had to 
be met) and the competing ethical issues in the case, Twin  A’s 
counsellor (JGRK) consulted several other genetic counsellors, 
medical geneticists and medical ethicists on how the case should 
be managed. Opinions were divided on whether testing should be 
performed or not and whether Twin A could legitimately be denied 
the test, and several counsellors were ambivalent.
However, while the twins had said that they were identical, and 
understood from their mother that they were identical, according to 
Twin A no DNA testing had ever been performed to confirm zygosity. 
Research shows that the closest correlation to DNA test results on 
monozygosity is the twins’ own opinion, which was reported to be 
95% correct.[14] When Twin A returned to demand testing, the issue 
of monozygous twinning and the lack of confirmation that she and 
Twin B were identical were discussed with her. Since Twin A refused 
zygosity testing, the counsellor could say that her HD result might 
not strictly apply to her sister, and that if her sister ever wanted to 
know her own status, she would have to go through the predictive 
testing process herself. This solution itself raised ethical issues, but 
Twin A’s autonomy and right to be tested was considered to take 
precedence. The outcome of this session was that the patient had 
her blood sample sent for analysis. The result showed that she did 
not have the expansion mutation that causes HD. Subsequently she 
informed us that Twin B had learned of the result from a family 
member, but was still refusing to be tested.
Predictive testing in children
A couple presented at the genetic counselling clinic to discuss the HD 
test results on the two children placed in their foster care. The foster 
parents informed the counsellor (TW) that the children’s mother 
had HD and the children (a boy aged 5 and a girl aged 2 at the time) 
had been removed from her care, but they had little information on 
the father. The medical practitioner involved was consulted by the 
adoption agency (which also dealt with foster care) dealing with the 
case, and HD testing on the children was requested when they were 
removed from their mother’s care. A private laboratory was consulted 
(possibly because academic laboratories had a policy of refusing 
to test children unless there were clinical symptoms), performed 
the tests and gave the results, which showed that one child had the 
expansion allele and the other did not. A few years after this initial 
testing the children were placed with the couple in foster care. A 
paediatrician was then consulted and the children were retested for 
HD, by the same private laboratory. However, this time the report 
stated that both children had inherited the condition (each with 50 
repeats). Since such results were highly unlikely a sample mix-up 
could be suspected, and, in addition, these results differed from those 
of the first test.
During the genetic counselling session these conflicting and 
unreliable results, and whether testing should be repeated, were 
discussed with the foster parents (the children were not present). 
They were also apprised of the pros and cons of testing children 
and the details of the HD predictive testing guidelines (which 
recommended protecting children and avoiding testing them 
unless they had symptoms or treatment was available). The genetic 
counsellor took the role of child advocate and as such was reluctant 
to support another request for HD testing. She explained that 
the autonomy of the children should be respected and their right 
to choose regarding testing at a later stage preserved. The foster 
parents were not aware of the early health history of the children, 
but from their comments there was no convincing evidence of any 
clinical signs, or of juvenile onset, in either child. Such early onset 
would have been expected if the children actually had the high 
number of repeats suggested by the results of the second test. It was 
then decided that the children should be evaluated by a neurologist, 
and based on his findings a decision could be made regarding 
whether or not to repeat the HD testing.
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During follow-up telephonic conversations between the counsellor 
and the foster mother, she stated that they had not yet pursued the 
neurology consultation and that the children, now teenagers, were 
still healthy and would remain in foster care until they were 18 
years of age. Although the foster parents felt that their knowledge 
regarding the children’s history of HD was a heavy burden to carry, 
they had decided not to discuss it with the children. The issues 
raised by this attitude could not be fully addressed telephonically; 
however, the foster mother indicated that the foster parents would 
plan to attend another consultation to discuss the future of the 
children.
Discussion
In both these cases the principle of respect for autonomy was in 
conflict with the rights of the individual. In the first case the right 
of one twin to know conflicted with the right of the other not to 
know, and in the second case the rights of the children to their own 
genetic knowledge and to give informed consent to testing conflicted 
with the rights of the adoption agency and the foster parents to full 
information. In both cases paternalistic decisions were made initially, 
which were not satisfactory, did not take into account all the ethical 
issues, and had to be altered later.
Many ethical issues arose in these cases. Certainly issues of 
respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice 
(inequality), and even issues of paternalism, were faced. In the 
first case the autonomy of Twin A clashed with that of Twin B. 
Individualistic paradigms and traditional bioethical frameworks 
support the presenting autonomous individual as the primary clinical 
unit.[15] This approach prioritises her/his right to know over another’s 
right not to know, even when the other at-risk person has her/his 
own legitimate claim. Autonomy and the absence of coercion are 
prerequisites for the testing individual, but when accepted they apply 
coercion on the other party, who loses her autonomy and the right to 
have her opinion accommodated at the same time. In a comparable 
situation, current clinical practice would prioritise the right of an 
adult offspring to be tested over the right of an at-risk father not to 
be tested, and this approach has been supported by the IHDA and the 
WFN.[16] However, the 2013 guidelines state that ‘extreme care should 
be exercised when testing would provide information about another 
person who has not requested the test’.[13] These dilemmas have to be 
faced by genetic counsellors and clinicians who administer genetic 
services.[15]
Comparative justice was also highlighted when the needs of 
one individual had to be weighed against those of another (in this 
case Twin A and Twin B), taking into consideration the possible 
consequences for the twins themselves, and the need to try to identify 
who would benefit more and who would be harmed more. The duty 
of the counsellor to warn a third party also came up in this case (i.e. 
the impact of the client’s genetic information on the at-risk relative 
is indeed serious when that relative is an identical twin), although 
this duty to prevent harm conflicted with the duty to preserve 
confidentiality.
Although the issue of monozygotic twins is not specifically 
mentioned in the guidelines for testing,[13] the problems associated 
with predictive testing in twins have been recognised and, because 
the result in one would automatically confirm the result in the 
other, it has been suggested that testing is unwise.[17] However, a 
case where molecular testing occurred has been described. In this 
case the twins, although one twin initially stated that they were 
dizygotic, were tested and found to be monozygotic prior to HD 
predictive testing.[18] They then both agreed to have testing; this 
was co-ordinated by two counsellors, as the twins lived in different 
cities, and simultaneous provision of results was arranged. In the 
present case, the fact that zygosity was not confirmed allowed 
the counsellors to adhere to both twins’ rights to autonomy and 
individuality, as well as to the principle of non-maleficence, by 
causing the least harm to both.
In the second case predictive testing of children was performed, 
although it was of no direct benefit to them. Here the predictive 
testing guidelines are clear on recommending that testing should 
not be performed to determine the suitability of a child for adoption 
(or, in the present case, foster care).[13,19] Information on the status 
of children could lead to discrimination, stigmatisation and insult 
to the psychological wellbeing of the child.[20-22] Such testing raises 
questions regarding intrafamilial relationships, confidentiality, 
disclosure and paternalism. The benefits (generally relating only 
to the parents, but in the present case also to the adoption society 
staff, on behalf of the foster parents) include removing parents’ 
worries, facilitating planning and preparing for the future, taking 
advantage of available technology, providing early treatment (where 
the disorder is treatable, e.g. phenylketonuria), and maintaining 
vigilance in healthcare. However, the harms (generally relating 
to the child) include disturbing the parent-child relationship, 
damaging the child’s self-esteem, raising anxiety about the onset 
of symptoms, removal of the child’s right to decide, and providing 
no direct benefit to the child (e.g. in HD). In many cases, parents 
consider it their right to decide, on behalf of the child, whether and 
when to have testing undertaken. In the present case the adoption 
society, who were involved in placing the children, made the testing 
decision, so that the foster parents could be fully informed about the 
health of the children to be fostered and could make their decisions 
accordingly. Whether the society was in fact obliged to inform the 
prospective foster parents about this history is debatable. However, 
if the agency had informed the foster parents of the family history 
only, the autonomy of the children could have been maintained. 
Children may therefore need a child advocate (a genetic counsellor 
can play this role) to protect their interests.
Early in the 1990s the British Society of Human Genetics stated 
that there should be a general presumption against genetic testing 
when there is no health benefit for the child.[23] Many guidelines 
support the child’s right to autonomy in making decisions at the 
age of 18 years;[24] however, an informed decision should be made, 
and the age at which this is possible is usually considered to be 18 
years.[3] Although the children in the present case were younger 
than 18 years, and although the foster parents were reluctant to 
discuss the HD history with them, they should be informed of their 
at-risk status according to current recommendations.[13] Professionals 
should assist the parent, or in this case the adoption agency and 
foster parents, to consider how to inform the children and to arrive 
at a decision that results in least harm.[25] The foster parents should 
have had ‘access to genetic counseling, support and information 
including discussion of all their options for dealing with [their foster 
children] being at risk’.[13] However, a study by Duncan et al.[21] found 
that in the case of 22 immature minors who were tested for HD, 
testing was mostly requested by the parents and in 64% the results 
were not communicated to the children. Studies on the attitudes of 
parents and children in this situation have been reviewed by Michie 
and Marteau,[26] who highlighted the need for increasing relevant 
psychological research.
A further ethical issue to consider is the role of the genetics 
laboratory in testing children. According to the recent guidelines 
for predictive genetic testing, the laboratory should ensure that 
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such testing is accompanied by genetic counselling.[13] Although the 
term genetic counselling has not been defined in these guidelines, 
it is unlikely that either the adoption agency staff or the medical 
practitioners involved had the necessary skills to provide such 
counselling. The laboratory staff should therefore not be absolved 
from their responsibility, in the present case and in future similar 
cases, to test only in the context of appropriate counselling.
Conclusion
The cases described here illustrate the difficulties that arise in dealing 
with ethical issues in practice. Experience and ethical guidelines are 
often helpful in resolving dilemmas, but genetic counsellors may 
arrive at different solutions in similar cases, or no solution may be 
found.
How then should ethical issues be resolved? A code of ethics 
has been drawn up for medical geneticists[27] and for genetic 
counsellors (this code is promoted by the National Society of 
Genetic Counselors in the USA, and published in Appendix A in 
Veach et al.[28]). Also, in these situations there are a few general 
guidelines for what genetic counsellors (having become familiar 
with the basic principles of bioethical practice) should do, and the 
use of the ETHIC model is suggested: Examine relevant personal, 
societal, client and professional values; Think about what ethical 
standard of the code of ethics applies to the situation, as well as 
about relevant laws and case discussions; Hypothesise about the 
possible consequences of different decisions; Identify who will 
benefit and who will be harmed; and Consult with supervisors and 
colleagues about the most ethical choice.[29]
Although the Health Professions Council of South Africa has its 
own code of ethics for guiding professional behaviour, South Africa 
still requires ethical guidelines for genetic services, and these need 
to be developed by the Department of Health in consultation with 
the South African Society of Human Genetics, the professionals 
providing services in the field, and consumers of the service. 
Because access to genetic information is expanding exponentially, it 
is important to be aware of the ethical issues involved in providing 
this information to the public, and the present study gives some 
indication of how complex these issues can be. Resolving ethical 
dilemmas is challenging, each situation is unique, often there are 
no ethically right or wrong answers, and often a contextual clinical 
judgement must be made.[25]
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